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Does business relationship affect accuracy of analyst earnings forecast? 
Evidence from China 
 
Abstract 
 
Supporting the ‘conflicts of interest hypothesis’, we show that, in China, 
better-informed analysts issue more optimistically biased forecasts and reputation 
of financial analysts mitigates the bias. We contribute to literature by showing that 
such an adverse information effect varies over types of investment banking 
relationships and a better developed local legal environment reduces forecast bias. 
Our results call for a better developed market mechanism to discipline analysts so 
as to issue independent and accurate earnings forecasts in China. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role played by institutional investors in shareholdings and activism has become more 
important. For example, the value of institutional shareholding increased from US$16 trillion 
in 2005 to US$30 trillion in 2011 in U.S and from £2.7 trillion to £3.6 trillion in U.K. 
Meanwhile, the stock markets in emerging economies have also experienced a very fast 
development over the last two decades, especially before the financial crisis. The total stock 
market capitalization in China, for instance, accounted for 53% of GDP in 2007 with a value 
of US$3.9 trillion and 162 million investors and the institutional shareholding increased from 
5% in 2002 to 49% in 2007. Hence, the increasing importance of institutional and individual 
shareholding has created a strong demand for professional financial analysts who regularly 
forecast the earnings ability and corporate performance of the target firms (Lonkani and Firth, 
2005). Moreover, China, as an emerging market, has an enormous financial market which is 
not fully developed and therefore, financial analysts could place strong impacts on share 
prices, further strengthening the institutional investors’ incentive to exert pressure on analysts. 
The pressure from institutional investors is also facilitated by the lack of public scrutiny 
(Firth et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2013). Hence, the investment banking relationship effects on 
analysts’ bias are likely to be more pre-eminent in China. 
It has been widely acknowledged that analysts’ earnings forecasts are useful for decision 
makings and long-term earnings forecast explain more variations in forecasted price than 
short term forecasts (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1995). Analysts earning expectation has also 
been found to have a strong impact on the behavior of managers and the average return 
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associated with more accurate recommendations is greater than that recommended by 
analysts with lower forecast accuracy, by 1.27% per month (Kross and Suk, 2012), 
suggesting that, in an imperfectly efficient market, the costly and accurate information 
collection would be rewarded by market (Loh and Mian, 2006). Because of the important role 
played by analyst forecasts, the effects of earnings forecasts and guidance have also been 
investigated both empirically and theoretically such as its effects on market return (Anilowski 
et al., 2007) and the stock market sensitivity to analyst forecasts (Beyer, 2008). 
It is expected that analyst forecasts should be as accurate as possible by fully reflecting 
all relevant information available so as to provide unbiased guidance to institutional and 
individual users. However, the accuracy could be adversely affected by various factors, such 
as the investment banking relation and trading commission motivations. Governing bodies 
have attempted to regulate the analyst forecasts by, for example, issuing financial penalties to 
misleading analysts and structurally reforming companies which provide both investment 
banking services and forecasts at the same time. In June 2003, U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) alleged firms which had associated analyst financial compensation with 
their investment banking revenue and promised favorable forecasts, in order to have more 
underwriting opportunities. The ‘Global Settlement’, for example, issued a total of US$1.4 
billion financial penalties to ten investment banks and required a complete separation of 
investment banking business from research departments to ensure that there is neither a direct 
nor an indirect relation between analyst compensation and investment banking revenue. By 
doing so, analysts are expected to be able to provide independent and third-party research, 
such as earnings forecasts, to the firm’s customers. Similar regulations became effective in 
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China from 2006. Even though, forecast bias has been widely observed in various markets 
and it calls for a further investigation on the effects of regulation or legal development in 
mitigating the forecast bias. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate if better-informed analysts provide more 
accurate earnings forecasts and how the forecast bias is mitigated by the reputation effects 
and the development of a local legal system in China. By following (Cowen et al., 2006), we 
define ‘better-informed analysts’ as those who have developed certain investment banking 
relationships with the covered firm. Such relationships have been identified as a primary 
source of conflicts, with privileged access to private information of the covered firm and 
trading commissions from brokerage businesses (Gu et al., 2013). There has been ample 
empirical evidence on the various effects of such investment banking relationships (Gu and 
Xue, 2008; Mehran and Stulz, 2007) but less is understood about how different types of such 
relationships affect financial analysts’ forecasts. This is, however, important because different 
types of investment banking relationships, such as IPO, SEO and M&A, may contain 
different set of private information about the business and consequently have different 
impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts after such investment banking activities. Hence, 
this paper addresses an important issue in earnings forecasts and investigates analysts’ 
incentives and behavioural biases in a setting of investment banking relationships. In addition 
to existing literature which investigates the impacts of trading commission fees on forecast 
accuracy, we break down investment banking relationships into IPO, M&A and SEO and our 
results on IPO point to the source of analyst bias that has been little explored in the literature. 
We contribute to literature in the area of financial analyst forecasts from two aspects. 
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First, it has been widely accepted that analysts who have underwriting or investment banking 
relations with target firms are more likely to provide optimistic forecasts. In this paper, we 
break down the underwriting relationships into Initial Public Offering (IPO), Seasonal Equity 
Offering (SEO) and Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) in order to examine the heterogeneous 
effects of different investment banking relationships on the accuracy or bias of analyst 
forecasts. Second, we investigate if a well-developed legal system could mitigate such bias in 
earnings forecasts to highlight the importance of legal system development in disciplining 
financial analysts in emerging markets.  
Our empirical materials are from Chinese stock markets. Our results show that consistent 
with existing literature, investment banking relationships drive optimistic earnings forecast 
errors and such effect is strongest for an IPO relation, followed by a SEO relation and a M&A 
relation. Second, we find that the optimistic bias could be mitigated by the reputation of a 
financial analyst and a better developed legal environment. The mitigating effect of 
reputation is more than 4 times stronger for a ‘better-informed’ forecast than for a forecast 
without information advantage. In addition, as far as the authors are aware, for the first time, 
we show evidence on the disciplinary effects of local legal system on the accuracy of 
financial analysts’ forecasts. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the 
second section, we review existing literature and focus on the determination of analyst 
forecast error and its effects. We describe our data and variables in the third section and 
report the empirical results in the fourth section. Finally, we summarize and conclude in 
section 5. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Analyst forecast bias and investment banking relationship 
With the improvement of stock market efficiency, annual report as the main source of 
historical information is no longer able to meet the information demands of investors and the 
forecasts of companies’ future earnings are becoming more and more influential. Analysts, as 
an important information intermediary and the main source of forecast, play a critical role in 
alleviating the information asymmetry and in enhancing the market efficiency by issuing 
research reports. This is because, compared with individual investors, analysts have more 
professional knowledge and more private information about the target companies. They are 
also more independent and more objective than the management team of companies in the 
evaluation of corporate performance and earnings ability (Yuan and Huang, 2007; Zhu et al., 
2007). Moreover, their characteristics, such as reputation (Gu et al., 2013) and rationality 
(Löffler, 1998), have been found to play a determinant role in the accuracy of their forecasts, 
even on leadership transition (Caceres and Malone, 2013) and GDP growth (Ashiya, 2006).  
There are a variety of reasons and incentives for financial analysts to issue bias forecasts. 
First, according to ‘information-advantage hypothesis’, analysts having less accurate and 
private information about the firm would issue more biased forecasts (Jacob et al., 2008). 
Second, because of the trading incentives, investment bank-affiliated analysts are more likely 
to issue optimistically bias forecasts to impress companies so as to sell more investment 
banking services to such firms (Bessler and Stanzel, 2009). Third, in order to keep a good 
relationship with management team of the company to access more private information, 
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financial analysts are likely to issue more optimistically biased forecasts (Lim, 2001). Fourth, 
according to the ‘conflicts of interest hypothesis’, analysts have an incentive to generate more 
trading commissions for the brokerage firms they work for when their monetary 
compensation is strongly associated with commissions (Karamanou, 2011). 
‘Information-advantage hypothesis’ suggests that analysts have more private information 
about the covered firm when there is inadequate information disclosure from the firm and 
there is a greater degree of asymmetric information between investors and the firms they 
invest. Policy-makers have issued relevant information disclosure regulations to ensure 
market participants to be informed as fully as possible, such as the Dissemination of 
Price-Sensitive-Information in U.K and Regulation of Fair Disclosure (FD) in U.S. Due to the 
emerging of information disclosure regulations, the comparative advantage of financial 
analysts in earnings forecasts has been reduced significantly (Palmon and Yezegel, 2012). 
Empirical evidence has also shown that since Regulation FD, information production and 
coverage of financial analysts has reduced (Gomes et al., 2007; Koch et al., 2013) and the 
informativeness of analyst reports has declined (Gintschel and Markov, 2004). There is also 
evidence showing that forecast accuracy (dispersion) decreases (increases) around Regulation 
FD (e.g., Bailey et al., 2003; Heflin et al., 2003)However, what is under studied is to what 
extent these changes in forecast properties are driven by the regulation itself or other 
concurrent events (Francis et al., 2006) and how it affects specific optimistic bias, where 
conflicts of interest may not be altered by the regulation. 
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Indeed, because of the information advantages, via an investment banking relationship 
for example, better-informed analysts would have more accurate earnings forecasts (Allen 
and Faulhaber, 1989; Chen and Martin, 2011; Jacob et al., 2008)than less-informed analysts. 
The favorable effects of information advantages in forecast accuracy have also been found in 
China (Yuan and Huang, 2007; Zhu et al., 2007). Therefore, according 
‘information-advantage hypothesis’, we hypothesize 
 
H1_1: Better-informed financial analysts, who have investment banking relationships with 
covered firms, would issue more accurate (less biased) earnings forecasts. 
 
‘Conflicts of interests hypothesis’ suggests that analyst forecast bias exists because of the 
gap of interests between analysts themselves and the users of earnings forecasts and the 
objective of forecast is to pursue self-interests of analysts rather than to provide an accurate 
forecast for the decision making of users (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 
1999). There are three reasons why analysts could benefit from biased, e.g., optimistic, 
forecasts. Firstly, analysts would impress companies by favorable forecasts in order to sell 
more investment banking services. Secondly, analysts expect to keep a good relationship with 
management team in order to access more private information. Thirdly, analysts expect to 
generate more trading commissions for the brokerage firms they work for when their 
monetary compensation is strongly associated with the commission (Karamanou, 2011). 
Supporting empirical evidence has shown that analysts, who have an underwriting 
relationship with the target firms, are more likely to have optimistic forecasts (Bessler and 
9 
 
Stanzel, 2009; Lin and McNichols, 1998). Similar evidence is also available in Chinese stock 
market (Firth et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2013; Yuan and Huang, 2007). 
Sell-side financial analysts have been criticized for their optimistic reports and failing to 
detect accounting and over-valuation problems. Their optimism is partially driven by trading 
incentives and firm reputation reduces such optimism (Cowen et al., 2006). In Japan, it has 
been found that forecasts from sell-side analysts are more optimistic and less accurate than 
the forecasts from information-providers who do not make stock recommendations (Conroy 
and Harris, 1995). Therefore, the optimism generates a demand for forecasts from 
conservative analysts to improve the overall efficiency of forecasts in the market. Indeed, 
market actually reacts more strongly to the forecast revision by more conservative analysts 
(Hugon and Muslu, 2010). Therefore, according to ‘conflicts of interests hypothesis’, we 
hypothesize 
 
H1_2: Better-informed financial analysts, who have investment banking relationships with 
covered firms, would issue less accurate (more biased) earnings forecasts. 
 
For example, Beyer (2008) models the costs for managers for falling short of the 
analyst’s forecast and their incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Financial analysts would be aware of the intention of management to 
manipulate earnings upwards if earnings fall short of the forecast and they also have an 
incentive to forecast earnings above the median of reported earnings, which does not 
minimize the expected absolute value of the forecast error. Business ties, such as investment 
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banking relationships, would facilitate the private transfer of information between the firm 
and the analyst’s brokerage firm. Existing evidence has shown that underwriting relationships 
play a substantial role in analyst’s behavior (Clarke et al., 2007; O'Brien et al., 2005) and how 
each type of such relations would affect forecast accuracy is under studied. Therefore, an 
investigation on the effects of subsequent underwriting business following the IPO (i.e. SEO 
and M&A) would enable us to better understand the competing theories about the 
determinants of analyst forecast accuracy.   
For example, while IPO underwriting has been widely documented as a source of 
conflicts of interest, leading to biased forecasts (O'Brien et al., 2005), there has been little 
evidence on the effects of other types of underwriting, such as SEO and M&A on forecast 
accuracy. IPO firms may rely on high-status brokerage firms and analysts to creating a liquid 
market for their stock (Cowen et al., 2006) and brokerage firms also seek for a long-term 
business tie with the firm to pursue new underwriting businesses. IPO underwriting is often 
considered as the biggest contributor of underwriting income of brokerage firms, which 
provides stronger economic incentives for analysts to forecast more optimistically since their 
researches are funded by underwriting activities. Moreover, analysts following is of greater 
importance around IPO because they value the potential for future revenues (Hope, 2003). 
IPO underwriters are more likely to pressure their analysts to issue favorable forecast, since 
IPO underwriting is the first step to build a long-term business tie with the firm. Meanwhile, 
compare to SEO and M&A information asymmetry is more severe at the time of the IPO 
since there is less publicly available information. Coupled with stronger economic incentive 
and weaker information advantage, we propose that the effect of IPO underwriting on analyst 
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forecast accuracy (or bias) is stronger than that of SEO or M&A. Moreover, compared with 
IPO, SEO involves less complicated process even the underwriter has to negotiate with both 
the issuer and governing body in China. For related financial analysts, who have developed 
an investment banking relation by underwriting IPO for instance, would have less pressure to 
explore future business opportunities and the conflict of interest, therefore, become less. 
Therefore, we hypothesize 
 
H2. The effects of investment banking relationships on forecast accuracy (or bias) vary over 
types of such relationships among IPO, SEO and M&A.  
 
2.2 Analyst forecast bias and reputation of analysts 
Forecast accuracy is also found to be determined by the characteristics of the analysts, 
such as their firm-specific experience, size of their employer brokerage firms (Hussain, 2002), 
the number of industries and firms they follow (Kim and Park, 2012), and financial analysts’ 
perception of earnings quality (Barker and Imam, 2008) and etc. In addition, empirical 
studies have shown that accuracy is associated with forecast immediacy, the speed with 
which analysts respond to a significant change in publicly available information set (Mozes, 
2003) and a consensus of updated forecasts (Stickel, 1993). Reputation of financial analysts 
has also been found to play an important role in forecast accuracy. This is because star 
analysts enjoy an immediate and significant boost in compensation and industrial status and 
their brokerage firms also gain a significant enhancement in publicity in the market (Gu et al., 
2013). Because of the mitigating effects of reputation on forecast bias, we hypothesize 
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H3. Financial analysts with better reputation would issue more accurate earnings forecasts. 
 
2.3 Other determinants and legal environments 
Equally, the characteristics of the covered firms also matter, such as their intangible 
information (Higgins, 2013), continuity of capital gains (Jung et al., 2015), product market 
power and market concentration (Datta et al., 2011), earnings distribution (Clement et al., 
2011; Gu and Wu, 2003), return predictability (Chen and Martin, 2011), overconfidence of 
managers (Hilary and Hsu, 2011), use of corporate non-financial information (Orens and 
Lybaert, 2010), and accounting information system (Wang, 2013).   
The effects of earnings forecast and guidance have also been investigated both 
empirically and theoretically, such as those on market return (Anilowski et al., 2007), and the 
stock market sensitivity to the analyst’s forecasts (Beyer, 2008). Indeed, it has been 
acknowledged that sell-side earnings forecasts are useful for decision makings for users of 
sell-side analyst forecasts and long-term earnings forecasts explain more variations in 
forecasted price, than short-term earnings forecasts (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1995). Moreover, 
analyst forecasts also affect management behavior (Athanasakou et al., 2009; Rees and Twedt, 
2011). Managers have an incentive to keep a track record of consistently meeting or beating 
analysts’ earnings expectation and firms with such a record are more likely to guide analysts’ 
forecast revisions downward to avoid breaking the consistency (Kross and Suk, 2012; Loh 
and Mian, 2006). In addition, Loh and Mian (2006) examine the average return associated 
with different forecast accuracy and find that the average return associated with more 
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accurate analysts’ recommendations is greater than that recommended by analysts with lower 
forecast accuracy, by 1.27% per month. It suggests that, therefore, in an imperfectly efficient 
market, the costly and accurate information collection would be rewarded by the market.  
Market has the ability to adjust and reduce forecast bias and such ability ‘could serve as 
a proxy for analyst reputation costs’ (Karamanou, 2011, pp.3). For example, in the markets 
with stronger investor protection laws (common-law countries), financial analysts issue more 
accurate and less dispersed forecasts (Barniv et al., 2005), compared with the markets of 
civil-law countries. It has also been acknowledged that emerging economies have relatively 
weak investor protection embedded in their legal system and therefore ‘the building of their 
legal framework is one important task to develop their capital market’ (Wu et al., 2009, 
pp.179-180). China, as an emerging economy with huge territory, has developed its legal 
system over time but still features heterogeneous legal investor protection across the whole 
country (Wu et al., 2009). Unlike cross-country comparison studies, the unique data allows us 
to further investigate how the heterogeneous local legal conditions affect financial analysts’ 
forecasts within one country. Thus, we hypothesize 
 
H4. With a better developed local legal system, financial analysts would issue more accurate 
earnings forecasts. 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
3.1 Data 
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We collect the empirical information from two sources. Firstly, we collect analysts’ 
earnings forecast between May 2005 and April 20101 from Wind Info. Unlike existing 
empirical studies which also consider the revision of earnings forecasts (Das et al., 1998; 
Kross and Suk, 2012)，we focus on the latest forecast on earnings per share (EPS), i.e. the last 
forecast before EPS is reported by the firm. This is because the latest forecast should have 
incorporated all existing public and private information and it should have the least bias on 
the condition that analysts aim to provide accurate forecasts. By focusing on the latest 
earnings forecasts, the bias, driven by unpredictability and high earnings volatility in Chinese 
stock markets (Chen and Martin, 2011), would be minimized. As a result, we are able to 
investigate the motivation of bias and information-value with less noise. Secondly, we follow 
existing literature and collect firm level information for the forecasted firms from the same 
source Wind Info., such as industry, reported EPS, asset tangibility, discretionary accruals and 
etc. Thirdly, with each firm which is followed by one analyst or a number of analysts, we 
examine if there has been any ‘investment banking relationship’ between the firm being 
followed and the brokerage firm which the analyst works for. We collect ‘investment banking 
relationship’ information from China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
and an investment banking relation could be that the brokerage firm has been involved in IPO, 
SEO, and/or M&A of the firm being followed. Fourthly, to control for the ‘reputation’ effect, 
we follow (Gu et al., 2013) and collect the rankings of analysts from New Fortune which 
reports such rankings on a regular basis. Finally, we measure the development of local legal 
                                                        
1 We excluded earnings forecasts before May 2005. This is because first, there were very few analyst 
forecasting earnings of public companies and second, analysts’ forecasts were neither regulated nor standardised 
before May 2005.  
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environment by an index2 derived from (Fan et al., 2011) for the market where the followed 
firm headquarters.   
 
3.2 Variables 
The accuracy of analyst forecast could be measured in different ways. Firstly, we 
measure it by a comparable value Error1, which is defined as [(Forecasted EPSt – Actual 
EPSt)/Actual EPSt] and EPSt is the earnings per share at time t. In order to capture all relevant 
information available from the market, we use the most recent forecasted EPS issued by an 
analyst before an actual EPS is observed. In the robustness tests, we follow Capstaff et al. 
(1999)3 and measure the accuracy by Error2, [(Forecasted EPSt – Actual EPSt)/Share Pricet]. 
Error3 is a dummy variable measuring the optimism of the analyst forecast where Error3 = 1 
if forecasted EPS is greater than actual EPS; 0 otherwise. Error4 measures the relative 
accuracy and is coded as 1 if forecasted EPS is within the range of 0¼ where  is the 
standard deviation of the forecasted EPS. 
We measure the investment banking relationship by four dummies where IPO=1 if the 
brokerage company was involved in the initial public offering of the covered firm; 0 
otherwise; SEO=1 if the brokerage company was involved in the seasonal equity offering of 
the covered firm; M&A=1 if the brokerage company was involved in the mergers and 
acquisitions of the covered firm; and Relation=1 if the brokerage company was involved in 
any of IPO, SEO and M&A with the covered firm. Analyst’s reputation is measured by a 
                                                        
2 Legal environment index is derived by considering the percentage of lawyers in population, the efficiency of 
local courts and the protection of intellectual property.  
3 Capstaff et al. (1999) use the absolute value to measure the magnitude of forecast bias. We use the true value 
to reflect the optimistic and passive forecasts instead.  
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dummy Star and Star = 1 if the forecast is issued by an analyst who is ranked in top 5 in the 
industry by New Fortune; 0 otherwise. Finally, the development of local (province) legal 
system is measured by an index Law. Following existing literature, we consider firm level 
information as control variables, including size (Bhushan, 1989), diversification (Datta et al., 
2011), tangibility (Bhushan, 1989), leverage (Gu et al., 2013), discretionary accruals (Barker 
and Imam, 2008; Hope, 2003), standard deviation of EPS (Clement et al., 2011), and 
profitability (Das et al., 1998). Table 1 reports the definition of variables we consider in the 
following empirical analysis, including control variables and year and industry dummies. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here please] 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables and it shows that the forecasted 
EPS is significantly deviated from the actual EPS. Error1, winsorized at a 1/99th level, ranges 
from -1.19 to 3.00 with an average of 0.14. Among our samples, 16% of the forecasts are 
issued by analysts who have investment banking relations with the covered firms, including 
14% by IPO, 4% by SEO and 0.3% by M&A, including about 2% with more than one type of 
such relationships; 28% of the forecasts are issued by star analysts. In total, we use 31,175 
forecasts in the following analysis, excluding those forecasts on the earnings of financial 
institutions.  
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[Insert Table 2 here please] 
 
As one of our research objectives, we examine the development of the local legal system 
and Table 3 shows that overall, the legal system had become better developed during the 
period of 2005 and 2009 and the average Law index increases from 7.54 in 2005 to 10.40 in 
2009. It also shows that the variation of Law becomes greater and the standard deviation 
increases from 2.27 in 2005 to 3.26 in 2009.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here please] 
 
We report the univariate analysis results in Table 4. The upper panel shows that Error1 
and Error2 are statistically higher among the forecasts issued by analysts who have 
investment banking relations with the covered firms (better-informed analysts) than those 
without such relationships (less-informed analysts), supporting H1_2 and rejecting H1_1. It 
also shows, in the lower panel, that investment banking relationship drives optimistic 
forecasts. For example, 67.40% of forecasts issued by IPO related analysts are optimistic 
versus 32.60% of those forecast issued by analysts without an IPO relation, supporting H2. 
Overall, Table 4 implies a strong relationship between the optimistic forecast bias and the 
investment banking relation between the analysts and the covered firms. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here please] 
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4.2 Empirical results 
Firstly, we examine the effects of investment banking relationship, reputation and legal 
environment on the accuracy of analyst forecast. Table 5 shows that, by controlling for the 
characteristics of covered firm, industry and year, Error1 would increase by 0.2 if the forecast 
is issued by an analyst who has an investment banking relationship with the covered firm. It 
implies that better-informed analysts, by developing an investment banking relationship, 
provide more biased or less accurate forecasts, supporting the ‘conflicts of interests 
hypothesis’ (H1_2). The adverse effect of ‘information advantage’ could be mitigated by a 
reputation effect and a better developed local legal system. For example, forecasts issued by a 
star analyst would have a lower Error1 by around 0.07 and one degree of improvement of the 
local legal system could reduce Error1 by 0.003, supporting H3 and H4. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here please] 
 
As mentioned earlier, we aim to examine if such an adverse effect varies among different 
investment banking relationships, in terms of IPO, SEO and M&A. We then break down 
relation into IPO, SEO and M&A relations respectively and the results are reported in Table 6. 
It shows that the adverse effect of information advantage is mainly driven by the IPO relation 
and such effect is statistically insignificant for M&A relations. The marginal effect of IPO 
relation is nearly 8 times as strong as that of a SEO relation. This result is consistent with the 
existing literature on the biased and favorable forecasts motivated by creating more 
underwriting services from the brokerage firm’s customers (Karamanou, 2011). The 
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mitigating effects of reputation and local legal system are still consistent and robust, 
supporting H3 and H4.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here please] 
 
Secondly, by using interaction terms, we examine how the information issue and 
reputation effects vary in different legal systems and the results are reported in Table 7. It 
shows that the mitigating effect of reputation (Model 1) and that of legal system (Model 2) is 
stronger for forecasts issued by ‘better-informed’ analysts and those ‘better-informed’ 
analysts self-discipline themselves to issue more accurate forecasts in a better developed legal 
system, again supporting H3 and H4. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here please] 
 
To further investigate the different mitigating effects of reputation and legal environment, 
we break down our samples into two groups, one having investment banking relationship 
with the covered firm (Relation=1) and one without (Relation=0). The results are reported in 
Table 8. Consistent with the results in Table 7, Table 8 shows that the mitigating effect of 
reputation for ‘related’ forecasts is four times as big as that for ‘unrelated’ forecasts and the 
mitigating effect of law is only statistically significant for ‘related’ forecasts but not for 
‘unrelated’ forecasts. It highlights the self-disciplinary behavior of ‘better-informed’ analysts 
in a better developed legal environment, again supporting both H3 and H4. 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
In the previous sections, we show that forecasts issued by better informed analysts who 
have investment banking relationships with the covered firms are more biased and less 
accurate (H1_2) and the bias is more significant for forecasts issued by analysts who have an 
IPO relation than SEO and M&A relations (H2). In addition, the forecast bias could be 
mitigated by a reputation effect (H3) and the development of local legal environment (H4). 
To check the robustness of our results, we use Error2 to measure the forecast accuracy and 
follow the same regression approach used in Tables 5 and 6. Our results, not reported by 
available on request, are consistent and all earlier identified effects are significant and robust.  
Optimistic forecasts have been widely reported in existing literature (e.g. Karamanou, 
2011) and we also examine the propensity of a forecast being optimistic, i.e. forecasted 
EPS > actual EPS. Error3 is defined as a dummy, where Error3=1 if the forecast is 
optimistically biased and the results are reported in Table 9. It shows that a ‘related’ forecast 
is more likely to be optimistically biased than an ‘unrelated’ forecast. For example, the 
probability of a related forecast being optimistically biased is 24% (=e0.2178-1) higher than 
that of an ‘unrelated’ forecast being optimistic (Model 1). Meanwhile, the probability of 
being optimistic is 14% (=1-e-0.1499) lower for a forecast issued by a star analyst (Model 2). 
Every one degree of improvement of the local legal system could reduce the probability of 
forecast being optimistically biased by 1% (=1-e-0.0085) (Model 3). 
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[Insert Table 9 here please] 
 
Finally4, we examine the above effects on the probability of a forecast being accurate. 
We use Error4 to measure the relative accuracy and Error4 =1 if Error1 [(forecasted EPS – 
actual EPS)/actual EPS] is between -0.14 and 0.14, i.e. 0¼ where  (=0.54) is the standard 
deviation of the forecasted EPS. The results (Table 10) are consistent and robust. For example, 
it shows that the probability of a ‘related’ forecast being accurate is 46% (=1-e-0.6164) lower 
than that of an ‘unrelated’ forecast (Model 1) (H1_2). Meanwhile, the probability of being 
accurate by a star analyst is 14% (=e0.1270 -1) higher (Model 2) (H3) and one degree of 
improvement of local legal system increases the probability of being accurate by 1% (Model 
3) (H4).  
 
[Insert Table 10 here please] 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
 
To overcome the problem of asymmetric information between corporate insiders and 
outside investors, regulators have attempted to implement information disclosure mechanisms 
                                                        
4 As an additional robustness test for the reputation effect, we replace the reputation of a financial analyst 
(Star) by the annual revenue-based ranking of the securities company which a financial analyst works for. 
Our results partially support H3, where company’s ranking decreases forecast errors for related firms but 
such a mitigating effect is not statistically significant for non-related firms. We also consider the 
interaction effects between each relation with star and law and our key results are still hold. Results are 
available from the authors on request and we appreciate an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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(Chang et al., 2013) and to completely separate research and investment banking businesses 
from brokerage firms so that analysts could provide unbiased, independent and third party 
forecasts. However, biased, especially optimistically biased, analyst forecasts have been 
widely identified in empirical studies and the bias is found to be driven by trading, 
commission and transaction motivations behind financial analyst forecasts. Existing empirical 
studies from western developed countries have shown that affiliated analysts (analysts with 
investment banking ties) issue more optimistic earnings forecasts and more favorable 
recommendations (Cowen et al., 2006; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Mehran and Stulz, 2007; 
Michaely and Womack, 1999). However, these studies mostly focus on IPO underwriting and 
take IPO relation as a one-off transaction. We extend existing literature by breakdown the 
investment banking relationships into IPO, SEO and M&A and examine how each relation 
affects forecast bias in a theoretical framework of conflicts of interests. Specially, we 
investigate how the investment banking relationship with covered firms affect the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts and how the reputation effects and local legal system could mitigate the 
possible bias in China.  
By using hand-collected data from China stock markets, we show that investment 
banking relationships drive optimistic earnings forecast errors and such effect is strongest for 
an IPO relation, followed by a SEO relation and M&A relation. In other words, forecasts 
issued by better informed analysts are less accurate and more optimistically biased, 
supporting ‘conflict of interests hypothesis’ in China. Secondly, our results show that the 
optimistic bias could be mitigated by the reputation of financial analysts and a better 
developed legal environment. The mitigating effect of reputation is more than 4 times 
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stronger for a ‘related’ forecast than for an ‘unrelated’ one. For the first time, we show 
evidence on the disciplinary effects of local legal system on the accuracy of financial analyst 
forecast. This is especially important for emerging economies where legal system could be 
less developed and investor’s interests are less protected. 
 Our empirical results highlight the important role played by a well-developed legal 
system and call for the improvement of legal environment in China stock markets. A better 
developed legal system could work well as a mitigating factor for biased forecasts and this is 
because in a better developed legal system, misleading analysts may face higher costs of 
being sued and the asymmetric information problem is less serious. The biased forecasts 
identified in our paper would not weaken the favorable effects of the legal system 
improvement because the forecast bias could have been even greater without the 
improvement of legal environment. To further investigate such favorable effects, more 
information should be collected and a switching regression approach should be applied. We 
leave this for future research. 
 This paper also offers implications for future research. First, with the development of 
internet infrastructure and more widely use of social media, existing research has examined 
the economic value of social media investment and shown that firm value increases with 
social media use (Hitt et al., 2015). This would significantly increase the transparency of 
corporate performance and reduce the costs for potential investors to make decisions. 
Therefore, the information hypothesis could be altered by the use of social media which 
overcomes the problem of asymmetric information. Future research could investigate 
empirically how the use of social media could affect the accuracy of financial analyst’s 
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forecast. Second, as one of the weaknesses of this paper, we are not able to further investigate 
the role of affiliation5 on forecast bias. This is because the financial analysts in our data are 
all ‘sell-side’ and affiliated with securities companies which provide a full package of 
services, such as underwriting, brokerage and investment. It is possible, however, the 
affiliated company may provide different sets of services or could even be an independent 
research institution. Future research could look into such heterogeneity of financial analyst’s 
affiliation and their impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts so as to expand existing 
theories. Finally, there could be endogeneity issue where firms having an existing relation 
(e.g. IPO) with an investment bank are more likely to develop another relation (e.g. SEO or 
M&A). Due to the limited information from our data, we would leave this for future 
researchers. 
                                                        
5 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
Category Variable Definition 
   
Forecast 
accuracy 
 
Error1 (forecasted EPSt – actual EPSt)/actual EPSt 
Error2 (forecasted EPSt – actual EPSt)/actual share pricet 
Error3 =1 if forecasted EPSt >actual EPSt; 0 otherwise 
Error4 =1 if Error1 is between 0¼ where  is the standard deviation 
of the forecasted EPS; 0 otherwise 
Key 
determinants 
IPO =1 if there is an IPO relation between the securities firm and the 
forecasted firm; 0 otherwise 
SEO =1 if there is an SEO relation between the securities firm and the 
forecasted firm; 0 otherwise 
M&A =1 if there is an M&A relation between the securities firm and 
the forecasted firm; 0 otherwise 
Relation =1 if there is an IPO, SEO, and/or M&A relation between the 
securities firm and the forecasted firm; 0 otherwise 
Star = 1 if the forecast is issued by an analyst who is ranked as the 
top 5 in a specific industry; 0 otherwise 
Law Legal environment index 
Control 
Variables 
Size The natural log value of the forecasted company's total assets 
Div The number of the forecasted company’s cross-industries 
Tang Intangible assets / total assets of the forecasted company 
Lev Total liabilities / assets of the forecasted company 
DisAcc Discretionary accruals of the forecasted company 
EV The standard deviation of EPS in the past three to six years of 
the forecasted company 
Profit Absolute value of the operating profit divided by total profit of 
the forecasted company 
EM =1 if the forecasted company has a big loss（EPS<-0.2）or a small 
profit（0<EPS<0.05）; 0 otherwise 
Yeari Year dummies 
Indi Industry dummies 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 mean std dev median min max 
Error1 0.1360 0.5384 0.0241 -1.1875 3.0000 
Error2 0.0040 0.0171 0.0009 -0.0354 0.0988 
Error3 0.5558 0.4969 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Error4 0.5498 0.4975 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Relation 0.1604 0.3670 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
IPO 0.1400 0.3470 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SEO 0.0437 0.2045 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
M&A 0.0028 0.0531 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Star 0.2848 0.4513 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Law 9.3212 3.2670 10.0552 4.2984 13.0912 
Size 22.1879 1.3510 22.0480 19.2418 27.4872 
Div 1.4822 0.7788 1.0000 1.0000 8.0000 
Tang 0.0397 0.0636 0.0251 0.0000 0.8400 
Lev 0.4704 0.1858 0.4809 0.0178 0.9988 
Disacc -0.0109 0.1536 -0.0013 -2.3286 2.5003 
Ev 0.2940 0.2547 0.2276 0.0000 5.5158 
Profit 0.5254 3.6975 0.0505 -0.0083 69.0725 
Em 0.0254 0.1573 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Note: The total number of observation is 37,175. 
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Table 3: The development of legal environment in China by a measure of legal index 
Standard deviation is reported in parentheses. 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg. 
Law 
7.54 
(2.27) 
7.97 
(2.59) 
9.20 
(3.02) 
9.83 
(3.23) 
10.40 
(3.49) 
9.32 
(3.26) 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Univariate analysis 
This table reports the univariate analysis results. The upper panel examines the 
variation of Error1 and Error2 across forecasts issued by analysts with different 
investment banking relationships. The lower panel examines the proportion of 
forecasts being optimistic (Error3=1) and being pessimistic (Error1<0). ‘Yes’ 
means there is a specific investment banking relation, such as IPO and ‘No’ means 
there is not such an investment banking relation. ***, **, and * stand for a statistical 
significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Error1 Error2 
Yes No t value Yes No t value 
IPO 0.2951 0.1100 23.16*** 0.0144 0.0023 48.81*** 
SEO 0.1833 0.1338 3.63*** 0.0076 0.0038 8.73*** 
M&A 0.2217 0.1357 1.63 0.0076 0.0040 2.17** 
relation 0.2702 0.1103 21.14*** 0.0134 0.0022 48.14*** 
 
Optimistic forecast（%） Pessimistic forecast（%） 
Yes No z value Yes No z value 
IPO 67.40 32.60 22.48*** 30.39 69.61 -22.99*** 
SEO 58.12 41.88 2.99*** 36.96 63.04 -0.42 
M&A 62.86 37.14 0.83 34.29 65.71 -0.62 
relation 65.72 34.28 20.89*** 31.59 68.41 -21.79*** 
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Table 5: The effects of investment banking relation, reputation and legal system 
The regression approach applied here is OLS and the dependent variable is Error1. 
Not reported here, but available upon request, are the effects of year dummies and 
industry dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand 
for a statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Error1=β0+β1 relation+β2 star +β3 law +β4 div +β5 tang +β6 lev +β7 disacc +β8 EV 
+β9 profit+β10 EM +β11 profit + Year+ Industry +ε 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.4783*** 0.4339*** 0.4084*** 0.5158*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0591) (0.0590) (0.0585) 
relation 0.1980***   0.2008*** 
 (0.0088)   (0.0088) 
star  -0.0715***  -0.0763*** 
  (0.0048)  (0.0048) 
law   -0.0032*** -0.0030*** 
   (0.0009) (0.0009) 
size -0.0287*** -0.0245*** -0.0237*** -0.0279*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
div 0.0647*** 0.0647*** 0.0657*** 0.0652*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) 
tang -0.3217*** -0.3090*** -0.3046*** -0.3363*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0290) 
lev 0.4087*** 0.4300*** 0.4246*** 0.4010*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0192) 
disacc 0.0322* 0.0335* 0.0332* 0.0320* 
 (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0186) 
EV -0.0971*** -0.0987*** -0.1025*** -0.0966*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0105) 
profit 0.0079*** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
EM -1.0982*** -1.0469*** -1.0486*** -1.0948*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0209) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
No. of observations 37,175 37,175 37,175 37,175 
Adj R2 0.1540 0.1398 0.1366 0.1582 
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Table 6: The break-down effects of investment banking relation 
The regression approach applied here is OLS and the dependent variable is Error1. 
Not reported here, but available upon request, are the effects of year dummies and 
industry dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand 
for a statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Error1=β0+β1 relation+β2 star +β3 law +β4 div +β5 tang +β6 lev +β7 disacc +β8 EV 
+β9 profit+β10 EM +β11 profit + Year+ Industry +ε 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.5069*** 0.4452*** 0.4384*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0584) (0.0590) 
IPO 0.2316***   
 (0.0096)   
SEO  0.0294**  
  (0.0142)  
M&A   0.0655 
   (0.0514) 
Star -0.0730*** -0.0720*** -0.0716*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Law -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
size -0.0277*** -0.0240*** -0.0237*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
div 0.0660*** 0.0654*** 0.0654*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
tang -0.3374*** -0.3169*** -0.3133*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0287) (0.0285) 
lev 0.4007*** 0.4236*** 0.4233*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0193) 
disacc 0.0327* 0.0330* 0.0333* 
 (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0189) 
EV -0.0975*** -0.0995*** -0.1004*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
profit 0.0079*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
EM -1.1025*** -1.0457*** -1.0457*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 37,175 37,175 37,175 
Adj R2 0.1617 0.1402 0.1401 
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Table 7: The interaction effects of investment banking relation, reputation and legal 
system 
The regression approach applied here is OLS and the dependent variable is Error1. Not reported 
here, but available upon request, are the effects of year dummies and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for a statistical significant level of 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.5081*** 0.4769*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0584) 
relation 0.2488*** 0.3919*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0286) 
star -0.0500*** -0.0758*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0048) 
law -0.0030*** 0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
relation*star -0.1546***  
 (0.0149)  
relation*law  -0.0206*** 
  (0.0027) 
size -0.0279*** -0.0274*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) 
div 0.0655*** 0.0650*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) 
tang -0.3410*** -0.3229*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0288) 
lev 0.3977*** 0.3993*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) 
disacc 0.0302 0.0313* 
 (0.0186) (0.0187) 
EV -0.0954*** -0.0963*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) 
profit 0.0078*** 0.0079*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
EM -1.0966*** -1.0980*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0210) 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes 
No. of observations 37,175 37,175 
Adj R2 0.1606 0.1603 
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Table 8: The effects of reputation and legal system 
The regression approach applied here is OLS and the dependent variable is Error1. Not reported 
here, but available upon request, are the effects of year dummies and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for a statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
 Relation=1 Relation=0 
star -0.2115*** -0.0498*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0049) 
law -0.0157*** -0.0002 
 (0.0030) (0.0009) 
size -0.0343*** -0.0268*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0028) 
div 0.0881*** 0.0605*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0039) 
tang -0.4817*** -0.2751*** 
 (0.0692) (0.0314) 
lev 0.6232*** 0.3621*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0201) 
disacc 0.0295 0.0328* 
 (0.0573) (0.0189) 
EV -0.1466*** -0.0859*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0116) 
profit 0.0289*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0012) 
EM -1.4387*** -0.9094*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0277) 
Constant 1.0389*** 0.4651*** 
 (0.1668) (0.0603) 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes 
No. of observations 5,963 31,212 
Adj-R2 0.3002 0.1078 
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Table 9: The effects on being an optimistic forecast 
The regression approach applied here is Logit and the dependent variable is Error3. Error3 is 
coded as 1 if the forecasted EPS is greater than actual EPS, i.e. an optimistic forecast. Not reported 
here, but available upon request, are the effects of year dummies and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for a statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.9488*** 0.9184*** 0.8650*** 1.0424*** 
 (0.0968) (0.0973) (0.0969) (0.0964) 
relation 0.2178***   0.2205*** 
 (0.0134)   (0.0132) 
star  -0.1499***  -0.1529*** 
  (0.0076)  (0.0076) 
law   -0.0085*** -0.0083*** 
   (0.0016) (0.0016) 
size -0.0484*** -0.0425*** -0.0399*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
div 0.0791*** 0.0768*** 0.0799*** 0.0794*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0058) 
tang -0.4106*** -0.4007*** -0.3834*** -0.4339*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0400) (0.0394) (0.0414) 
lev 0.7099*** 0.7355*** 0.7225*** 0.6926*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0318) (0.0314) 
disacc 0.0873*** 0.0768** 0.0804** 0.0792** 
 (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0323) 
EV 0.0047 0.0124 -0.0037 0.0037 
 (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0208) 
profit 0.0221*** 0.0216*** 0.0217*** 0.0219*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
EM -0.2306*** -0.2396*** -0.2472*** -0.2043*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0648) (0.0646) (0.0644) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations 20,661 20,661 20,661 20,661 
Psuedo R2 0.1150 0.1090 0.1006 0.1266 
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Table 10: The effects on being an accurate forecast 
The regression approach applied here is Logit and the dependent variable is Error4. Error4 is 
coded as 1 if Error1 has a value between -0.14 and 0.14, i.e. 0¼ where  is the standard 
deviation of forecasted EPS with a value of 0.54. Not reported here, but available upon request, are 
the effects of year dummies and industry dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * stand for a statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -0.5460** -0.3616 -0.2914 -0.5979*** 
 (0.2272) (0.2243) (0.2246) (0.2282) 
relation -0.6164***   -0.6246*** 
 (0.0299)   (0.0299) 
star  0.1270***  0.1450*** 
  (0.0243)  (0.0245) 
law   0.0100*** 0.0108*** 
   (0.0029) (0.0030) 
size 0.1003*** 0.0858*** 0.0820*** 0.0966*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
div -0.1736*** -0.1707*** -0.1738*** -0.1760*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
tang 1.1002*** 1.0316*** 1.0295*** 1.1432*** 
 (0.1991) (0.1973) (0.1966) (0.1999) 
lev -1.3934*** -1.4327*** -1.3950*** -1.3494*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0758) (0.0770) (0.0775) 
disacc 0.3912*** 0.3866*** 0.4003*** 0.4043*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0803) (0.0807) (0.0824) 
EV -0.1147** -0.1046** -0.0994** -0.1182** 
 (0.0463) (0.0457) (0.0455) (0.0463) 
profit -0.0650*** -0.0644*** -0.0656*** -0.0658*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0145) 
EM -1.8709*** -2.0139*** -2.0081*** -1.8834*** 
 (0.1058) (0.1069) (0.1070) (0.1056) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 37,175 37,175 37,175 37,175 
Psuedo R2 0.0540 0.0540 0.0540 0.0540 
 
 
 
